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AMERICA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
An Experience at U.S. Embassy Moscow

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June 2002
Honors Senior Project
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HONORS THESIS

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“International Affairs is no longer the preserve of nation-states and multinational organizations. In an age characterized by the dispersal of power, globalization and the omnivorous consumption of information, public diplomacy has come into its own. Today, public diplomacy is neither an oxymoron nor an afterthought, but an integral component for successfully conducting U.S. foreign policy.” ~Howard Cincotta, State Magazine

The terrorist attacks on September 11th and the subsequent War on Terrorism during the fall of 2001 raised many questions within the United States about America's reputation abroad. Across the country, politicians, journalists, and the public were looking for reasons why there was a portion of the world's population that hated the United States so vehemently. Although apparent historical, political, and economic factors seemed hard for many Americans to accept, in the spirit of American pragmatism there had to be an aspect of American foreign policy and a U.S. government agency that could be blamed for not “selling” America well enough to the rest of the world. That aspect of American foreign policy was public diplomacy, and that agency was the Public Affairs Section of the State Department. The Public Affairs Section (PAS) is charged with the mission of public diplomacy which is the direct communication with foreign publics in the name of advancing U.S. interests. Public diplomacy as a tool of U.S. foreign policy came into conception at the end of World War II in response to the beginning of the Cold War, and the misinformation machine of the Soviet Union (Kirschten 1995). Although public diplomacy had widespread support in the 1950s and 1960s, it lost funding and appeal to the general American public through the 1970s until Reagan became president and reinforced the importance of it as an aspect of American foreign policy (Lord 1998). With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, many critics of public diplomacy encouraged reduced funding and eventual dismembering of the United States government apparatus because the historical force it was made to counter was gone

and there were no major perceived threats to the U.S. (Kirschten 1995). Throughout the 1990s, public diplomacy funding was reduced and the agency that had previously been in charge of the educational exchanges and the information programs- the United States Information Agency (USIA) was merged into the larger more bureaucratic State Department. The War on Terrorism brought this waning aspect of American foreign policy back into the news and into public discussions across the country. The House of Representatives held two hearings during the fall of 2001 that sought to figure out why public diplomacy had seemingly failed the U.S. and how the U.S. could fix its apparatus (U.S. Congress 2001).

I applied to intern for the State Department during the fall of 2001 and was assigned to the Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia. At first I was perplexed by this appointment because as a major in political science, with a focus on international and comparative politics, I had never been exposed to public diplomacy and the U.S. government's public diplomacy apparatus. In our political science undergraduate education we were taught about international relations through the organization of government activity, actions of top leaders and specific historical events. I was completely unaware of the practice of public diplomacy, yet alone the significant time, money and resources that the U.S. government put into communicating directly with foreign publics. I went to Moscow naive to the mission of the Public Affairs Section, and I quickly found myself with innumerable questions about what was going on around me, what I was working for, and what our intentions were. For much of my three months in Russia, I was piecing together the meaning of public diplomacy and attempting to swim in the bureaucratic ocean that I had been dropped into. I left the embassy with a

new understanding and perspective on American foreign policy and international relations, and the desire to create something tangible out of my recent experience.

This Honors senior project represents my six month exploration into the nature of America's public diplomacy. Throughout the past few months, I have sought to answer the question; What is America's public diplomacy? The following paper attempts to answer this question through an examination of the definition, history, organization, and programs that constitute the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus. I explored this aspect of American foreign policy through my on-site three month internship in the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy Moscow, and in three months of academic research into the history and issues surrounding America's public diplomacy. While my primary exposure to public diplomacy was only at one embassy in one country, I am confident that the programs and themes I observed are replicable of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus at work in our embassies around the world. While interning at the embassy, I worked for all three of the main sections of PAS as well as shadowed their activities, attended their meetings, questioned participants and generally observed the people and organization that compose America's public diplomacy. My project is grounded in scholarly research, yet I tried to include some of my personal experiences and observations as an outsider during my internship in PAS, because that is what I can offer to the study of public diplomacy. I have come to believe that public diplomacy is a very important, yet very under valued and misunderstood aspect of American foreign policy. I hope this project will make the theory and practice of America's current public diplomacy more understandable and perhaps defensible in a time when it is drawing public criticism for the areas of the world that remain anti-American. Although the original reason public diplomacy was embraced

in the U.S. has disappeared, its purpose has changed and it is just as useful in the year 2002 as it was in 1948. To begin to explore America's current public diplomacy it is imperative to understand the definition of the term "public diplomacy."

WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

Public diplomacy is a government's deliberate attempt to influence strategic elements of foreign populations, in a way that is beneficial to the interests of the initiating government (Hansen 1989). Not just a government activity, public diplomacy is also a theory, strategy, and tool of foreign policy. The initiating government is attempting to communicate with the targeted foreign audience, specifically without the involvement of that population's government. The premise is that the foreign populations, especially strategic elements of it, have an influence on the ruling government or will have an influence on future governments (Lord 1998). Making the targeted foreign population more tolerant or understanding of the government that initiated public diplomacy will ideally help the initiating government's treatment by the foreign populations' government within the traditional diplomacy realm. Often times the initiating government in public diplomacy, believes that the foreign population of a specific country is not getting accurate information about the initiating country due to a variety of reasons, including a government restricted speech and press, or a lack of technology and funding for education, and so they see it as in their best interest to provide that foreign population with "accurate" information (National 1996). In order to influence that foreign population in a way that is desirable to the government initiating the activity, the government must try to understand their perspective and tailor their message to that environment (Cromer 1997). While the United States government usually approaches public diplomacy from a

top-down effort to shape public opinion, they also strongly encourage connecting the American public to foreign publics because effective public diplomacy also can come from reciprocal person-to-person communication (Kirschten 1995).

Public diplomacy is an aspect of foreign policy that is little understood outside of directly involved actors including in America, ex-USIA Foreign Service officers, State Department officials, and a small scholarly world. Because public diplomacy is a relatively new term and a somewhat obscure concept to the domestic audience, it is necessary to differentiate public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy, public affairs, propaganda, and misinformation. What is often studied in international relations classes is traditional diplomacy, official government-to-government relations between sovereign nation-states (Kegley 1996). While traditional diplomacy, the charge of the U.S. State Department is the historic cornerstone of international relations, it has begun to be enforced and complemented in this century by public diplomacy (U.S. Embassy 2002). This newer approach to international relations has developed as governments have had the resources to pursue two different foreign audiences; official governments and their people. When USIA merged into the State Department in 1998, United States government officials claimed that the main reason for the merger was to put public diplomacy at the heart of American foreign policy, and to support traditional diplomacy (Albright 1999). Public diplomacy and traditional diplomacy differ not only in the target of their engagement, but also the way that they portray America. While traditional diplomacy speaks with one voice of the United States government, public diplomacy attempts to fairly represent the differing opinions and perspectives of U.S. citizens on many issues (U.S.I.A. 2002). Public diplomacy is also often confused with public affairs.

Within the American government, the term “public affairs” refers to the strategy and activity of distributing information about the government’s actions to the domestic audience, in an attempt to improve public support for government policies (U.S.I.A. 2002). The Public Affairs Bureau of the State Department works to influence the American public’s knowledge of and support for American foreign policy (Department 2002).

Within the study and practice of public diplomacy, there is widespread disagreement about the nature of this aspect of American foreign policy, and if it is essentially propaganda (Snow 1998). When the United States government first conducted public diplomacy programs in the 40’s, it openly defined them as propaganda, yet in the 70’s during the Vietnam war, Americans overwhelmingly did not support “propagandizing foreigners,” and the USG changed its explanation of public diplomacy to “mutual understanding” (Lord 1998). The scholarly debate over if America’s public diplomacy is propaganda or not, continues because of the many definitions of propaganda and personal perceptions of U.S. cultural and informational programs. William Hachten in *The World News Prism* defines propaganda as the “systematic use of words or symbols to influence the attitudes or behaviors of others” (Hachten 1999, 110). Charles Kegley in *American Foreign Policy* defines propaganda as “the methodical spreading of information to influence public opinion” (Kegley 1996, 135). Even though the term “propaganda” has a negative connotation attached to it in America, the dictionary definition and both of two cited definitions of propaganda do apply to and define America’s current public diplomacy efforts. While most government officials deny that America’s public diplomacy is propaganda, those that do call it propaganda, emphasize that they provide

truthful information that is not “misinformation.” Misinformation is a term coined to describe propaganda that is untruthful and full of falsehoods as opposed to propaganda that is based on truth (U.S.I.A. 2002). The institutions that have carried out America’s public diplomacy including the United States Information Agency, the International Communications Agency, and the State Department have always been publicly adamant that they provide and portray only truthful information because if they did not, foreign publics would not trust them (U.S.I.A. 2002). The father of America’s modern public diplomacy, Edward Murrow, testified in 1963 in front of a congressional committee as the director of USIA; “American traditions and the American ethic requires us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable, to be believable we must be credible, to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that” (U.S.I.A. 2002).

Public diplomacy is a government strategy and activity that is practiced by most governments in the world, although with often contrasting approaches, different tools, varying levels of funding, and differing titles for the same efforts. Western democracies usually practice similar methods of public diplomacy including promoting cultural exchanges, sponsoring libraries, and funding news-based broadcasting services (Hachten 1999). While public diplomacy efforts of non-Western countries often have the same goal of influencing foreign publics in their interest, they often have different methods of achieving their goals because of a lack of rules that bind Western public diplomacy apparatuses, including activities that break other countries laws, secretive programs, and threats against specific peoples (Hansen 1989). While the United States also utilizes many of these same tactics in its intelligence work, it does not employ them in its public

diplomacy efforts. Public diplomacy apparatuses around the world have varying levels of funding and domestic support. During the majority of the Cold War, the USSR and the United States clearly spent the most amount of money attempting to influence foreign populations. In a 1982 speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, the International Communications Agency director Charles Wick, estimated that the Soviet Union spent 2 billion dollars a year on “misinformation and propaganda” (Hansen 1989, 158-168). In the late 1970’s, while funding for public diplomacy was dropping in the United States, it was rising in many other countries of the world including France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan (Hansen 1989, 159). In 1984, France spent 1% of their national budget on public diplomacy efforts while the United States spent 0.1% of its budget (Hansen 1989, 159). Throughout the past thirty years as the communication revolution has affected every country and public diplomacy has been embraced as a government activity by modern nation-states, the United States has often been an example to interested countries about how to engage and influence foreign publics (Hansen 1989).

America’s public diplomacy can be defined by the missions of the two main U.S. government agencies that have been in charge of implementing it-USIA and the Public Affairs Section of the State Department. The mission of the USIA was “To understand, inform and influence foreign publics in the promotion of U.S. national interests and to broaden the dialogue between Americans, their institutions, and their counterparts abroad” (Ross, W 1998). This mission succinctly describes the definition of specifically American public diplomacy because it reveals how the agency is trying not only to influence foreign audiences with the interest of the U.S. in mind but also to understand the foreign audience, and link the foreign publics to the American public. On the current

State Department website, the newly conceived Public Affairs Section (PAS) explains its mission of public diplomacy as it “complements and reinforces traditional diplomacy by communicating U.S. interests directly to foreign publics, including strategically placed individuals and institutions” (Department 2002). While there is some difference between the USIA definition of public diplomacy and the State Department definition, the fundamental similarities between the two definitions including communicating with foreign publics and influencing strategic elements of those populations with American interests in mind, reflect the themes and definition of American public diplomacy.

Public Diplomacy is defined by not only its literal definitions, but also by the theory behind it and its role in American foreign policy. The theory behind public diplomacy and its function in U.S. foreign policy have both changed overtime yet to accurately understand America’s current public diplomacy apparatus, it is necessary to understand the theories that have historically motivated public diplomacy and those that continue to drive it. When public diplomacy was first utilized as a tool of American foreign policy in the early 1950s, it was a strategic weapon in the ideological Cold War battle with the Soviet Union (Kirschten 1995). The U.S. like the USSR was essentially trying to win the “hearts and minds” of the people in the Eastern bloc and all of those in countries that were yet unaligned (Kirschten 1995). Public diplomacy or truthful propaganda was one way that the U.S. government combated the Soviet Union’s public diplomacy efforts and many scholars have credited the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus for successfully providing alternative information and ideas to people living in the Eastern bloc, through public diplomacy tools like the Voice of America (Lord 1998). The U.S. was essentially battling the Soviet Union for influence around the world and that

goal of maintaining and having the ability to influence foreign populations is the main objective and theory behind public diplomacy that has lasted from its inception in 1948 to present day.

The main theory behind public diplomacy today is that it gives the U.S. the ability to influence foreign populations and all of the power that comes with that ability. Having the capability to maintain influence in foreign populations, in ways that are favorable to U.S. interests is seen as critical to the American government in continuing U.S. predominance in this century (National 1996). For much of history, in most areas of the world, the official governments of nation-states have had a monopoly on the power and decision making process within that state (Mathews 1997). In the past twenty years, with the information revolution, the spread of democracy, and a market oriented world economy, the power of the ruling governments has been constrained and the influence of non-state actors such as the media, non-governmental organizations, businesses, students, scholars and religious organizations have increased within many countries (Cincotta 2000). The U.S. government has recognized that these various elements of society are now players in domestic politics whose opinions and actions can have international ramifications and the USG currently seeks to engage such actors through its public diplomacy apparatus.

Other theories behind the justification for public diplomacy that are also important include first, the idea that getting the world to understand the United States requires a proactive approach, and second, that if successfully implemented public diplomacy will encourage mutual understanding thus reducing the chance for political, economic, and military conflict. The first theory states that in order that the world

community understands the positions, values and actions of the U.S., there must be a proactive strategy of the USG (National 1996). This idea recognizes that with increasing technology and the interconnectedness of the world, foreign publics often have access to information about the U.S. through avenues like CNN, Hollywood movies and American commercial products that are exported throughout the world. Current American public diplomacy rests on the belief that just because much of the world is exposed to some aspects of America, they do not have an accurate understanding of the history, culture, values and people that compose the U.S. (National 1996). Because foreign publics can not receive an accurate understanding of the U.S., it is necessary that there be a proactive, rather than a merely reactive program to engage those people. When public diplomacy began in the 1950s the goal was to win the “hearts and minds” of the world, and that goal has changed in the present day to merely trying to help the U.S. be accurately understood. Former USIA director, Joe Duffy has expressed that in his mind the current goal of getting the U.S. understood is far more important than getting people to like Americans (Kirschten 1995). The second theory, that if public diplomacy is successfully implemented it will reduce the chance for international conflict, can be seen even in the Smith-Mundt act of 1948 that established the USIA: “An act to promote the better understanding of the U.S. among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations (United States 1948).” Public diplomacy seeks to strengthen its relations with other countries, and in the process reduce chances for conflict because the countries will have a better understanding of the position and values of other countries.

Public diplomacy can be and is most often defined by the tools and programs that compose it. There are two main aspects of America’s current public diplomacy including

cultural and educational programs, and international information programs (Kegley 1996). The first aspect of America's public diplomacy consists of cultural and exchange programs which are trying to improve mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the world. The exchange programs encourage professional and personal connections between people and organizations in the U.S. and other countries (U.S.I.A 2002). The cultural programs aim to explain and expose foreign publics to the culture, art, history and people of the United States. Examples of a few of the cultural and exchange programs of America's public diplomacy include the Fulbright program, academic exchanges, English teaching, citizen exchanges, and programs for building democratic institutions (U.S.I.A 2002). Until 1998, when the USIA merged with the State Department, international broadcasting was the third primary aspect of America's public diplomacy (Kirschten 1995). This aspect included the well known- Voice of America (VOA) and the lesser known Radio Marti, Radio Free Europe and the latest addition of Radio Free Asia. Since 1998, the international broadcasting aspect of public diplomacy has been administered by a board of directors that makes it a separate agency from the State Department but it still is under the ultimate control of the Secretary of State (Lord 1998).

The second main aspect of America's public diplomacy consists of international information programs (IIP), which are extremely different in theory and practice from the cultural and exchange programs. International information programs utilize a wide variety of tools to communicate America's interest to the international audience and specifically strategic elements of foreign populations such as grassroots leaders, media, students and the business sector. The IIP programs attempt to not only influence foreign

populations toward U.S. interests but they also try to explain the policies of the U.S. government and all the intricacies and complexity of American society (Kegley 1996). The IIP use tools such as computers, the Internet, electronic media, publications, and speakers to conduct its programs. Examples of a few of the numerous information programs that the USG uses include recruiting American specialists in a wide range of fields to speak to their counterparts in other countries, digital video conferences (DVC) allowing international media to interview influential American leaders via the Internet, up-to date websites with information about the United States, and publishing books in multiple languages (U.S.I.A, 2002). After examining the definition, theory, and tools of public diplomacy, it is clear what America's public diplomacy is composed of and what it is ideally striving for. To understand how these goals have come about and how they have changed into what currently is America's public diplomacy, it is necessary to examine the history of public diplomacy in the United States.

HISTORY

America's public diplomacy has had a relatively short yet volatile history, spanning the twentieth century from its very beginnings in 1917, to the present day. The history of public diplomacy in the United States can easily be classified into four main periods all related to the Cold War including its pre-Cold War beginnings, its establishment as a permanent tool of American foreign policy in the early Cold War, to its fluctuating position in the late Cold War and finally its transformation and perhaps demise in the post-Cold War period. Although their relationship to the Cold War connects all four of these time periods, the status, organization, and support of public diplomacy as a vital tool of American foreign policy differs greatly in each phase.

Public diplomacy as a program of the USG has its roots in the pre- Cold War era when certain aspects of what today constitute tools of public diplomacy were first utilized for short periods of time. President Wilson is credited with starting to use information and propaganda as a tool when he established the U.S. Propaganda Office in 1917, seven days after the U.S. became involved in WWI (Kirschten 1995). This office was seen as merely part of the war effort and was consequently closed two years later in 1919. The next administration to utilize information and/or cultural exchanges as a foreign policy tool was President Roosevelt, who in 1938 created an Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific Cooperation, which contained a section called Cultural Cooperation (Kirschten 1995). This section began America's first cultural and educational programs targeting foreign audiences, aiming particularly to counter German influence in Latin America (Lord 1998). Roosevelt continued to add to the roots of the future public diplomacy apparatus when he created the Agency for Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda in 1941. In 1942, the Voice of America (VOA) was created to explain America to the world and to send in information to closed societies via short wave radio (Kirschten 1995). The VOA has been a controversial establishment because with its target audience being specific foreign populations, it has been accused of slanting information and preaching the ideal of America versus the truth about America. Heavier allegations against the VOA have included that it was merely "wartime propaganda and a psychological operation" (Lord 1998). A division of the Agency for Foreign Intelligence and Propaganda called the Foreign Information Service was merged in 1942 into the Office for War Information (OWI), yet another office created strictly for wartime. Following the end of WWII, President Truman closed the OWI but he decided to keep a subunit of the OWI called the

Public and Cultural Affairs Office and he moved it into the State Department (Kirschten 1995). In a 1946 speech, the head of the Public and Cultural Affairs Office publicly defended the mission of his office as not propaganda but “dignified information programs” (Kirschten 1995). This marked the first of a long line of debates within the United States of if the USG was propagandizing with these offices or merely telling the truth. Public criticism of public diplomacy came with the first few United States government activities that were trying to influence foreign populations in strategic ways. Most criticism of public diplomacy and accusations of its propaganda-nature came from the academic world, instead of the government itself. Even to this day, controversy still surrounds public diplomacy in the academic realm and in international politics. The pre-Cold war era was interesting for public diplomacy because it produced the roots of later public diplomacy programs yet the idea of continuing these information and educational activities as non-war efforts never seemed to stick with the United States government in this time period.

The early Cold War period (1946-65) marked the acceptance of American public diplomacy as a permanent and necessary tool of foreign policy, now with an official home in the United States Information Agency (USIA). This new position of public diplomacy was partially due to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (1948 Smith-Mundt Act), which established that the U.S. needed to improve its relations among the world population and it created the USIA with a focus on educational exchanges (United States 1948). Even though the act was passed in 1948, it was not until 1953 under President Eisenhower that USIA was a fully functioning agency. Because it was created at the end of the Korean War, the mission of USIA in its

infancy was to combat international communism (Kirschten 1995). McCarthyism and anticommunism plagued the United States during this time, aiding the United States government to find targets both in America and abroad who could be blamed for communism. The American attitude “of do something about it,” encouraged the success of programs like public diplomacy activities because they fought on the side of the “American people” against the communists. Also in the early 1950’s, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty, two more avenues for broadcasting over the short wave radio were created to intentionally send in international news and differing opinions from the state- controlled media in communist Europe and the Soviet Union (Lord 1998). In 1965, the term “public diplomacy” was first used by Dean Guillon of Tufts University, yet his phrase would not be embraced by the government or public for years to come (Hansen 1989, 3). Unlike during any other time period in American history, in the early Cold War years public diplomacy was widely embraced by the government and public as an activity that was necessary and very important to the goals of American foreign policy. When President Kennedy chose famed WWII journalist Edward Murrow as the head of the USIA, he further contributed to the widespread American public support of the mission of public diplomacy and the agency of the USIA (Powers 1999). The early Cold War period was important for the path of American public diplomacy not only because it was first embraced as a permanent tool of foreign policy but it also because this was the time when the goals, mission, and perspectives of the USG public diplomacy apparatus were fundamentally defined. It’s foundation from the early Cold War period has directed the path of American public diplomacy for the past fifty years and now is haunting the apparatus in the twenty first century as it is trying to redefine its mission and purpose.

The late Cold War period (1965-1991) challenged the foundations and success of American public diplomacy that had been established in the early Cold War period, as the Executive administration and public support for public diplomacy fluctuated widely ranging from the disregard by President Nixon to avid support by “the great communicator” President Reagan (Lord 1998). The fluctuating and sometimes unpredictable levels of public and presidential support during this time, affected the prestige, resources and future of American public diplomacy. The turning point in this time period was the Vietnam War, which challenged the assumptions of the political elite as well as the public’s support of the government and their activities of “propagandizing” foreigners (Lord 1998). The American people began to distrust their government and public diplomacy simultaneously entered a long period of decline until Reagan came to the presidency (Powers 1999). President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger are notorious for their geopolitical worldview and communicating directly with foreign publics did not fit into this method of international politics, so during their administration public diplomacy was almost totally ignored (Lord 1998). Partly in response to the lack of interest in public diplomacy by Nixon, when Carter became president he paid attention to this aspect of foreign policy and he reorganized the public diplomacy apparatus (Lord 1998). Carter named the USIA the International Communications Agency (ICA) in an attempt to distance it from its public image as an aspect of American foreign policy and he transferred educational exchanges from the State Department to the ICA (Kirschten 1995). Even though Carter brought back attention to public diplomacy by his interest in it and his reorganization, public support of it still waned and many scholars have accused Carter of doing little more for public diplomacy than reshuffling the bureaucracy

(Kirschten 1995). In 1980, Radio Marti was created as a replica of Radio Europe, to target Cuba's communist regime and to provide the Cuban people with international information and the positions of the U.S. (Kirschten 1995). Near the end of the Cold War, Reagan came to the presidency and supported and reinvigorated public diplomacy to a level that the White House had not seen since President Roosevelt (Powers 1999). Reagan attempted to refocus public diplomacy efforts with strategic interests in mind and he changed the name of the USG public diplomacy agency back to USIA and changed the drive of the USIA to reinforcing the legitimacy of democracy, under the strong leadership of USIA head Charles Wick (Lord 1998). As the late Cold War period ended in 1991 when the Soviet Union fell, public diplomacy programs like the Voice of America were credited with contributing to the demise of the U.S.S.R. and the eastern bloc (Lord 1998). Despite the successes of public diplomacy programs during the Cold War, after 1991 American support for public diplomacy plummeted and its future was uncertain.

The post Cold War period (1991-present) continued the fluctuating levels of support for public diplomacy that characterized the late Cold War but it brought new questions of the rationale, demand, logic and need for American public diplomacy in a non bi-polar world. With the fall of the Soviet Union, many Americans argued that without a strong ideological battle, the need to inform foreign publics of the U.S. perspective had disappeared (Kinzer 2001). There was no longer an urgency to speak to the common people of the world to counter a threat to the U.S. so the increasing public diplomacy monetary resources and personnel of the Reagan presidency were abruptly stopped (Cromer 1997). In the early 1990's, President Bush decided to eliminate Radio

Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty at the same time that the Voice of America was in a slump with a smaller budget and less USG support (Lord 1998). During the Clinton presidency, public diplomacy continued to decline in support although he did change a few aspects of their programs (Powers 1999). Clinton established an International Broadcasting Bureau when he signed the International Broadcasting Act in 1993, which consolidated the various broadcasting organizations (Hachten 1999). In 1994, Clinton also began Radio Free Asia targeting China, Tibet, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and North Korea (Hachten 1999). During the Clinton administration, the budget of public diplomacy was drastically cut, which reduced not only the programs of the USIA but also the staff.

A major event affecting the path of American public diplomacy in the post Cold War period was the 1998 merger between USIA and the State Department. This merger was directly the result of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 and indirectly the result of political disagreements in Washington about the status and future of public diplomacy. The official sound bite of the State Department was that the merger was intended to put public diplomacy at the heart of America's foreign policy and to increase the harmony of the message that the USG was sending to foreign governments and foreign publics (Rubin 1999; Albright 1999). Not only did the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act merge the USIA into State but it also took out and separated the broadcasting aspect of public diplomacy by creating a Board of Broadcasting that is independent of the State Department. The current Bush administration has attempted to give a fresh image to the new public diplomacy apparatus of the Public Affairs Section of State by controversially choosing a successful advertising

executive named Charlotte Beers to head the Public Affairs Section (Munro 2001). The controversy of Beer's nomination stems from the idea that America is not a product to be sold to the world, like Beer's past accomplishments selling Uncle Ben's rice bowls and toilet paper (Battle 2001). The choice of a private sector advertiser also continues the American political debate about if parts of government would be better run by private sector trained executives or government trained officials. Secretary of State Powell has defended the unprecedented choice of an advertiser to head America's public diplomacy by arguing that the United States has to sell its message better to the world and who is more qualified to do that, than a successful private sector advertiser. The September 11, 2001 terrorists' attacks and the subsequent War on Terrorism have brought public diplomacy back into the national spotlight as the government, the media and the public have reevaluated the apparatus and its mission. Because of the hostilities toward the U.S. in many areas of the world, Americans wanted to know why America's public diplomacy was seemingly not working, and there were calls to put more money and resources into the section of the USG that sells America's culture, society, government and perspectives to the world (U.S. Congress 2001). The post Cold War period has been very interesting for the study of public diplomacy because it has included polar opposite trends from the 1991 cry that public diplomacy was not needed anymore, through ten years of budget cuts and waning prestige, to 2001 when suddenly some of the effects of reduced public diplomacy in Central Asia and the Middle East were felt and there were cries across the nation for more public diplomacy funding and programs.

Although the history of American public diplomacy has been relatively short, it has been filled by drastically different levels of public and governmental support, various

ideas of what the mission and purpose of public diplomacy should be and different ideas of what kind of programs best communicate with foreign publics. The history of American public diplomacy reveals that the future of public diplomacy has always been uncertain and in short periods of time and because of specific events, support for it can rise and drop at astonishing rates. History has also shown that the organization and programs of America's public diplomacy apparatus have changed multiple times throughout the past century. Understanding America's current public diplomacy requires an introduction to the State Department's organization and numerous Public Affairs Section programs.

ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAMS: STATE DEPARTMENT & PAS MOSCOW

The Department of State is the federal agency that is currently charged with the mission of organizing and implementing America's public diplomacy. For most of the history of public diplomacy, it has been carried out by the United States Information Agency (USIA), an agency that was considered semi-autonomous from the State Department yet ultimately it had to answer to the Secretary of State. USIA was divided into four bureaus including the Bureau of Information, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, International Broadcasting Bureau, and the Bureau of Management (Ross 1998). Since 1998 when USIA merged into the State Department, most of the programs and goals of USIA were transferred to the newly conceived Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs Bureau. This bureau is one of the six main bureaus of State and is currently led by undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers (Department 2002). The Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau has two main missions and is divided into three major sections including Educational and Cultural

Affairs (ECA), International Information Programs (IIP) and Public Affairs (PA). The former two sections have the mission of public diplomacy, informing foreign audiences, while the latter section has the sole mission of informing the American public of international relations and American foreign policy (Department 2002).

When USIA was established in the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act, stipulations in the act clearly called for two different sources of information for foreign publics and the domestic American audience (United States 1948). This distinction calls into question the original intent of America's public diplomacy in the 1940's. If public diplomacy was going to be truthful in the beginning, why was there a need for two different sets of information, one for Americans and one for the rest of the world? The two separate sources of information are rarely mentioned in scholarly writing about the USG's public diplomacy apparatus, leading to the conclusion that perhaps the American people do not know that the American government deliberately provides different information to them and foreign populations. When the State Department took over the activities of USIA, they maintained the distinction between information organized for the American public and that for the foreign public, with the argument that each audience had different informational interests. The difference between public diplomacy (information for foreign publics) and public affairs (information for American audiences) becomes organizationally confusing in the State Department because they call the public diplomacy activities and programs at U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad, Public Affairs Sections (PAS). Despite the title Public Affairs Section, these sections have nothing to do with an American audience and everything to do with information for foreign audiences.

The Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is identical in organization to PAS's at U.S. embassies around the world, although in size it is significantly different from other PAS's. Despite the size difference, PAS Moscow is an appropriate case study for an examination of America's public diplomacy because its similarities and differences with other PAS's reveal the basic organization and current conditions of this foreign policy apparatus. PAS Moscow is similar to all Public Affairs Sections in that the same United States government public diplomacy theory drives all programs, most PAS's have the same cultural and information programs, and the same Foreign Service Officers rotate between the embassies. All American embassies and PAS's specifically, had to deal with the ramifications of September 11th and the War on terrorism during the fall of 2001. While some embassies close to Central Asia had to drastically change their activities to support the War on Terrorism, other PAS's like PAS Moscow continued with their regular activities, while tailoring some of them to the War on Terrorism. The funding and subsequent size of U.S. embassies around the world is based on the historical and current relationship between that country and the United States, and its value in our foreign policy. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is particularly large in funding and personnel because of the importance and value of Russia in historical and modern American foreign policy. The main reason why PAS Moscow is different from other PAS's is its immense size of personnel and resources for programs. PAS Moscow has 51 employees, out of which 13 are American Foreign Service Officers. In most U.S. Embassy's there are a maximum of three PAS Foreign Service Officers including the Public Affairs Officer, the Cultural Attaché, and the Press Attaché. While most PAS's are funded by base funding which is generated yearly by Congress to the

State Department's Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and International Information Programs (IIP), half of PAS Moscow is currently funded by the Freedom Support Act. The Freedom Support Act was started by Congress in 1991 to provide additional resources for developing and supporting the Newly Independent States (U.S. Department 2001). During FY 2000, U.S. government programs in Russia received \$168 million dollars from the Freedom Support Act, with public diplomacy programs accounting for \$25 million dollars of that budget (U.S. Department 2001). Since receiving millions of dollars yearly from the Freedom Support Act, Moscow PAS has blossomed in personnel and programs. Despite the immense size difference in personnel and number of programs, the common features shared by all Public Affairs Sections make it possible to examine PAS Moscow and to draw inferences about what constitutes America's current public diplomacy apparatus.

Public Affairs Sections (PAS) at U.S. embassies around the world are composed of three main divisions including the Cultural, Press and Information Resource Sections. While America's public diplomacy is often created and organized by the Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) and International Information Programs (IIP) at State headquarters in Washington D.C., the programs are implemented and given life in the Cultural (mostly ECA programs), Press (mostly IPP programs) and Information Resource (usually IIP programs) Sections of U.S. embassies across the globe. The real work of public diplomacy occurs in these three sections, as Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service Nationals communicate directly with foreign publics in implementing a diverse range of programs. I worked for all three sections in PAS Moscow, which allowed me to be exposed to the daily operations, programs, and participants of the breadth of

America's public diplomacy. My internship coincided with the beginning of the War on Terrorism, so I was also able to observe how the Cultural, Press, and Information Resource Sections channeled information about the war into their regular programs. While PAS Moscow created a few new activities to influence the Russian's public perception of the USG position, they did utilize many of their existing public diplomacy avenues to explain and defend USG activity in Afghanistan. Some of these programs will be explained in the following sections with close-ups of specific Cultural, Press and Information Resource Section activities. Perhaps more than any other aspects of public diplomacy including its definition, theory, and history, the programs that constitute it, are what really define and explain America's current public diplomacy. Because PAS programs are the heart of communicating with foreign publics, it is necessary to examine them more in-depth and to look at their mission, the span of programs, close-up's on a few programs, and my impressions within each section.

CULTURAL SECTION

The largest section of PAS Moscow is the Cultural Section which is charged with the mission of increasing mutual understanding between Americans and the Russian public. The Cultural Section aims broadly to widen Russian understanding and appreciation of the U.S. as a country with an emphasis on recognizing its political process, culture, values and diversity. The long term theory behind the goals and programs of the Cultural Section is to improve the bilateral relationship between Russia and the U.S. and to encourage Russian openness to American ideas and actions. PAS Moscow utilizes two main avenues in pursuit of its mission of mutual understanding including encouraging connections through individuals, groups of people and businesses

between both countries, and by exposing Russians to American culture including its history, art and traditions (U.S.I.A 2002). Unlike the other sections of PAS, the Cultural Section usually partakes in programs and activities that have long term goals and unquantifiable results. Most programs of the Cultural Sections in PAS's in U.S. embassies around the world are organized by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) which is one of the three main bureaus within the Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Bureau.

Of all three of the sections of PAS Moscow, the Cultural Section organizes and implements the most numerous and wide-ranging set of programs. Upon arriving at the embassy, I was overwhelmed by the numerous programs that the Cultural Section monitored and implemented. It took me weeks to separate what programs were designed for whom, and I eventually concluded that there are two general types of programs including exchanges and cultural education programs, targeting four main audiences: students, teachers, businesspeople, and leaders. The first type of program that the Cultural Section implements are academic and professional development exchange programs. Since 1993, the U.S. government through all of its departments has sent 44,500 Russians to America on long-term academic exchanges or short-term professional exchanges (U.S. Department of State 2001). During the FY 2000, 2,700 Russians went on PAS Moscow exchanges consisting of 900 Russian citizens on academic exchanges and 1,600 Russian citizens on professional exchanges (U.S. Department of State 2001). Examples of academic exchanges organized and implemented by the Cultural Section include famous programs like the Fulbright Graduate and Senior Scholar program and many not-so famous academic exchanges like The Freedom Support Act Undergraduate Exchange

Program, The Freedom Support Act Secondary School Exchange Program, Future Leaders Exchange Program, Contemporary Issues Fellowship Program, Regional Scholar Exchange Program, Junior Faculty Development Program and Partners in Education (U.S.I.A 2002). Unlike academic exchanges which target secondary, undergraduate, graduate students and faculty at different stages of their careers, professional exchange programs target mid to end career professionals in a wide range of professions. Examples of professional development exchanges run by the Cultural Section include the International Visitor Program, Special Regional Leaders Program, NATO tours, Parliamentary Exchange Programs, Open World Russian Leadership Program, and Community Connections Programs which consist of Business for Russia, Community Connections Professionals, Presidential Management Training Initiative, and the Productivity Enhancement Program (U.S.I.A 2002).

The second type of general program that the Cultural Section runs besides exchanges are cultural education programs which consist of many different kinds of activities, with a diverse range of goals. Examples of cultural education programs include the Democracy Commission, Regional Initiatives, U.S. Speakers and Specialists, Book Translation and Publication Program, Educational Information Centers, Internet Access and Training Programs, English language Office, EFL Fellow Program and art and cultural exhibits (U.S.I.A 2002). These various programs are the heart of America's public diplomacy. It is, however, impossible to explain all of the programs and their goals here due to the plethora of programs and the desire to keep this project in the paper and not book format. Because the basic mission of the Cultural Section is to improve mutual understanding between Russia and the U.S., the following section will examine three

programs particularly geared toward this end, including the International Visitors Program which sends Russian citizens to the U.S., the Democracy commission which focuses on improving Russia's social infrastructure through local energy and direction, and the English Language Fellow Program which sends American specialists to Russia.

Close-up: International Visitors Program

One of the largest of the professional exchange programs administered by PAS Moscow is the International Visitor Program (IV). Funded by both the Freedom Support Act and base funding, the IV program has sent over 1,500 Russians since its beginning in 1991 to the United States (U.S. Department of State 2001). The IV program sends Russian professionals in the middle to end of their career to the United States for one to three weeks on specific themed programs relating to their professional field. Examples of program themes include democratic and economic reform, defense and foreign policy making, rule of law, education, freedom of religion, taxation and budget, health care, and art management. Participants in the IV program are sent to cities across the U.S. depending on their program theme where they are introduced to their American professional counterparts. The participants are nominated by U.S. embassies and consulates and are usually recommended through local contacts and non-governmental organizations. Although most IV participants are mid-career Russian professionals in many different fields, the program has also sent high level Russian government officials including in 2000, eight Duma members who met in Washington D.C. with U.S. Congress members to discuss nuclear waste management (U.S. Department of State 2001). Although the IV program is a typical public diplomacy program administered at U.S. embassies around the world since the 1950s, it only began at the U.S. Embassy

Moscow in 1991. The IV program has gotten larger each year and in FY 2000, it sent 400 Russians to the U.S. Since the program has been administered by PAS Moscow, it has cost the United States government over \$15 million dollars (U.S. Department of State 2001).

Although there are many professional exchange programs administered by the Cultural Section, the International Visitor's program is a good example of the typical exchange program because it is administered widely at U.S. embassies, it has a common organizational structure, is theme based, and participants are chosen by similar criteria. Unlike some of the exchange programs utilized by the Cultural Section that are specifically for the Newly Independent States, the IV program is a typical Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) program that is implemented by most Public Affairs Sections at U.S. embassies around the world. The IV program is also organized similar to most other exchange programs because it is funded by the USG, monitored by the PAS, participants are chosen by the Cultural Section and partner NGO's and American institutions in the states do all of the planning and logistic work for the programs to succeed. The one to three week duration of the IV program is also typical of the length of time for all of the professional exchange programs. A typical characteristic of exchange programs is that they are theme based, usually relating to classic American attributes including democratic political system, citizenship, rule of law, freedom of religion and media, and business. Participants for USG exchange programs are chosen in merit-based competitions, with reference to the applicant's home-town region and professional. PAS Moscow has been trying to intentionally seek out participants from all of the regions of Russia especially eastern Russia, where citizens do not have the same

resources as Muscovites. Overall the IV program like all exchange programs, is trying to expose Russians to American business and social ideas that they can use as their country is rapidly developing.

Close-up: Democracy Commission

While the majority of the programs that the Cultural Section implements are exchange programs similar to the International Visitor program, they also have some programs that focus directly on Russian institutions and organizations that are helping to strengthen Russian social and economic infrastructure. An example of this kind of support program is the Democracy Commission, which is funded by the Freedom Support Act. The Democracy Commission is a commission organized by PAS Moscow, but composed of representatives from the Political, Economic, Public Affairs, Science and Technology, and USAID sections of the embassy, that awards grants to grassroots Russian NGO's working to improve Russian democracy and civil society. The Commission reviews proposals of groups that need financial support to get a program or organization started with the requirement that they will be self-sustainable in the long term and will continue to work to improve civic education, human rights advocacy, volunteerism, environmentalism, free flow of information or public policy. The Commission tries to sponsor democracy-building organizations that are not supported by any other large NGO's, private foundations or the Russian government. The most financial support that any one grant will receive is \$24,000 and in FY2000, 17 grants were awarded costing the USG over \$150,000 (U.S. Department of State 2001). The Democracy Commission began in U.S. Embassy Moscow in 1998 and has sponsored over thirty-two grants at a total cost of \$500,000 (U.S. Department of State 2001).

I observed the December meeting of the Democracy Commission, which exposed me to the procedural and practical aspect of this type of public diplomacy program. Ten commission members from five embassy sections attended the meeting and reviewed seven proposals from Russian grassroots organizations. The meeting began with a discussion about what to do with proposals that are poorly written and unintelligible. The debate became heated as some members thought that the mission of the Democracy Commission was to provide assistance to organizations that needed it and most likely those organizations would not have experience with writing professional proposals. Other members felt if the group had not taken the time to think about what they were proposing, they shouldn't be considered for a grant. The debate ended with agreement that the director of the commission would filter through the applicants and make her own decision. The proposals that are being examined and voted on during a particular Democracy Commission meeting are sent beforehand to the members so they can review the proposal before discussing it with the commission. In December, the board reviewed seven proposals asking for funding from around Russia, which ranged from setting up women's crisis centers, to inter-ethnic tolerance programs, to purchasing a bus for a roaming youth program. The main interests of the commission members when reviewing proposals was to make sure that the grassroots organizations and the specific project being proposed were not funded by any other government or organization. That the USG was not assisting any particular individual or organization multiple times, was also a common concern of most PAS projects. There are many requirements about how the grant money from Washington DC could be spent by an organization, including that it can not go to pay salaries and it must be spent in a way that makes a program self-

sustainable after the initial grant is spent. Much of the commission discussion centered on if the requested money would be spent at the right places and if the project would really be self-sustaining afterwards. After each proposal was discussed, the Democracy Commission voted on the proposal and as in a truly democratic nature, the majority won. Three of the seven proposals were approved during the December meeting and the decision to approve a proposal or not was almost always unanimous.

Although the Democracy Commission is a relatively small and cheap program, it is a rare opportunity for grassroots Russian organizations to directly petition the American Embassy for money and reciprocally, an opportunity for the USG to directly assist local groups who are forgotten by other institutions, and help them essentially help themselves. The Democracy Commission is challenging and teaching Russian organizations not only how to write grant proposals, but how to make programs that are self-sustainable and will not continually rely on hand outs of money from a government. This program is also a classic example of how American public diplomacy aims to spread information about the attributes of successful democracies including protecting human rights, freedom of religion, an independent media, involved citizenship, and creating grassroots organizations and interest groups.

Close-up: English Language Office

Another important example of the types of activities and programs that the Cultural Section implements is the English Language Office (ELO) and its English as a Foreign Language (EFL) Fellow program. The mission of the Cultural Section of improving mutual understanding between Russians and Americans is supported by the English Language Office which seeks to further engage Russians through increasing

English language competence. The ELO encourages learning English as a foreign language throughout Russia by organizing teaching activities, creating educational programs and materials. The ELO works at its mission with the Russian Ministry of Education, non-governmental organizations, Russian English as a Foreign Language professionals, and Peace Corps Russia. Most of their activities focus on developing English language teaching materials and professionals, teaching business English and American studies. The ELO also ships subsidized (usually costing Russians one dollar per book) English language materials across Russia on request to schools and institutions. The ELO also funds an English as a Foreign Language Fellow training program where American specialists in teaching English as a Second Language (TESL) and applied linguistics live in Russia for one year and work with Russian professionals and teachers on curriculum, material development and TESL methodology. In 2001, there were ten ESL fellows at institutions of higher education around various regions in Russia. Since the EFL Fellow program began in 1994, there have been over forty ESL fellows at a cost of over five million dollars (U.S. Department of State 2001).

I interviewed a Foreign Service Officer connected to the English Language Office while I was in Moscow and I was surprised by her impressions of teaching English as an aspect of public diplomacy and bilateral relations. I had worked for the English Language Office throughout my internship and it appeared to me like the only section that did not fit into the Public Affairs Section mission of public diplomacy. How did teaching English help to explain and defend the positions of the United States government? I asked a Foreign Service Officer who worked with the ELO to explain to me how teaching English fit into America's current public diplomacy apparatus and the bilateral

relationship between Russia and the United States. She saw English as a language that would help the Russians enter the world community, improve the Russian-American bilateral relationship, and encourage economic development (Anonymous 2001). Because most global conferences are dominated by English and most books are printed in English, becoming proficient in English will ideally help Russians become involved in international affairs. In the view of the USG encouraging Russians to learn English is an asset to the Russian-American bilateral relationship because learning another language often encourages the learner to be more understanding of that country (Anonymous 2001). She explained that her office was not only trying to encourage teaching English as a second language but they were mostly concerned with improving the quality of the English teaching that was already occurring (Anonymous 2001). There are only ELO at twenty posts worldwide and they only visit communities and schools in that country that specifically invite them.

The Cultural Section's mission of improving mutual understanding is carried out by the English Language Office's EFL Fellow Program where American experts in Teaching English learn about Russians by living in Russia for one year. While the majority of the Cultural Section's exchange programs send Russians to the United States, some programs like this one, send Americans to Russia. The EFL Fellow program has many characteristics that are similar to other specialists programs run by PAS where American specialists with a minimum of a Master's degree travel to another country to teach local professionals or schools their craft. Not only do the Russians in the communities where the Fellows live benefit from their year stay, but the Americans also learn significantly about Russia.

Impressions of the Cultural Section

Through my participation and work in many different activities and meetings of the Cultural Section, certain aspects of influencing foreign publics struck me as key features of America's public diplomacy. Exchange and cultural programs target very specific audiences including professionals in many fields and young leaders. I was very surprised that the targeted audience was not just political leaders but leaders in a diverse range of fields from health care to education. Clearly such broad training in many occupations is a way that the USG makes public diplomacy programs appear non-threatening to foreign governments, but it also encourages positive development across a countries entire infrastructure, not just political system. America's public diplomacy not only targets specific audiences but it is seems to be very theme based and the themes are very "American" ideas and values. It became very clear to me over my internship that America's public diplomacy especially in the Cultural Section depends on cooperation with NGO's and separate institutions. More often than not it appeared as though the USG funded programs and therefore had the right to monitor NGO's who did all of the logistic and planning work behind the exchanges. This is a very interesting relationship because the USG was able to be involved in more programs, with fewer personnel and they could attach their name to more programs with little work. I was intrigued by the wide range of programs that the Cultural Section implements from the Fulbright Program, to the professional exchanges, to the Democracy Commission, to cultural exhibits. The diverse range of programs reveals that there are many ways to attempt to influence foreign populations and the USG is currently utilizing many of them.

PRESS SECTION

The Press Section is charged with the mission of explaining and defending U.S. policies and activities to foreign publics. Being able to explain America's political and economic interests to a target foreign audience at a critical time and in an effective manner is seen by the United States government as essential to solving transnational problems and fundamental to maintaining positive bilateral relations. The mission of the Press Section of communicating America's interests directly to foreign populations is a major aspect of America's current public diplomacy. Unlike the Cultural Section, where their work is mostly on organizing and implementing programs, the Press Section work is policy oriented as it helps to create and enforce State Department policy, as well as it is a resource for the Russian media and the American government. The Press Section does organize some programs for media assistance but they are not a large percentage of the sections activities. The Press Section utilizes resources and guidance from the International Information Programs (IIP) Section of the Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy bureau.

In carrying out its mission of explaining and defending U.S. policies, the Press Section is responsible for three main kinds of activities including first, being press support for the embassy, the Ambassador, and visiting senior officials, second, monitoring and analyzing local public opinion, and third, assisting the host country media. The first task of being press support for the embassy requires the Press Section to handle all questions from the Russian media and public about American foreign policy, usually pertaining to the host country. The Press Section works closely with the local media by not only answering questions but putting opinion editorial articles by U.S.

government officials in local print media and electronic media and by maintaining regular relations with the local journalists. The Press Section and especially the Press Attaché work regularly with Russian journalists, editors and the Russian Ministry of Information. The Press Section assists the Russian media by offering opportunities to interview U.S. government officials through WorldNet, digital video conferences, and television program production. Besides being press support for the embassy as a whole, the Press Section is also press support specifically for the ambassador and other high level embassy officers. The Press Section organizes press conferences, public appearance, and interviews for the ambassador as well as writes his speeches. On a less regular basis, the Press Section offers press support for senior United States government visiting officials such as the President or the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet members. During such visits, the Press Attaché is the main point of contact for the local media and assists the American journalists who travel with the visitor.

The second main activity of the Press Section is to monitor and analyze local public opinion and media. Within the Press Section of Moscow PAS there are several people who spend the majority of their time following coverage of U.S. activities in the print media and electronic media. Not only does the Press Section report on host country public opinion but they develop activities and programs to influence that public opinion in a way desirable to U.S. interests. The Press Section keeps the ambassador and appropriate officials at the Department of State abreast of Russian public opinion and reactions to international events. The third main task of the Press section is to organize programs that assist the local media. Examples of such programs in the past few years include an internship program for media managers, an International Visitors program for

journalists, a small grants program helping independent television series, and Thematic Reporting Tours bringing Russian journalists to the U.S. to meet with the their counterparts on specific themes.

The Press Section explains and defends American policies to foreign publics through many different avenues including as the following close-up's demonstrate, by means of the media and directly to the target population. The following section will examine a digital video conference (DVC) with Ambassador Pifer, and Ambassador Vershbow's speech to Moscow State University, as examples of the Press Section's regular public diplomacy efforts. While both of these examples, a DVC and a speech by the ambassador, are regular public diplomacy tools utilized by Moscow PAS these close-up's show how current USG opinion and activity like the War on Terrorism can be communicated to the host country through PAS programs.

Close-up: DVC with Ambassador Pifer

On October 10, 2001, the Press Section organized a digital video conference (DVC) question and answer session between Ambassador Pifer in Washington DC and eight Russian journalists at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Digital video conferences are meetings held through electronic equipment as two different audiences in separate locations can speak and listen to each other over a digital computer. These teleconference programs are tools developed by the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) that have only recently been used by Press Sections at embassies around the world. This equipment can be used in many ways but it is usually utilized to allow host country journalists to interview high level U.S. government officials who can not easily travel to that country. This kind of technology puts Russian journalists in contact with key

officials in the U.S. government who they would not otherwise be able to interact with. The DVC's organized by the Moscow Press Section usually relate to current events in America or the international community.

The DVC that I attended on the tenth of October was generally about the subject of terrorism and specifically the perspective of the United States Government on its actions post September 11th. Ambassador Pifer explained the War on Terrorism and the most recent foreign policy decisions of the USG before the journalists began to ask him questions. There were eight journalists from major Russian newspapers at the conference, all individually invited by the Press Section. Ambassador Pifer does not speak Russian and the journalists did not all speak English so there were translators at both ends of the conference to interpret for both audiences. The double translation slowed the pace of the meeting down but both sides were heavily engaged in the electronic interaction. The Russian journalists asked Ambassador Pifer many questions ranging from "what were the motives of the September 11th terrorists?" to "will the U.S. bomb Iraq soon?" While Ambassador Pifer attempted to keep the conversation on terrorism, two of the Russian journalists were pressing him for answers about how the United States was handling Iraq and if we had any plans to attack Iraq soon. Ambassador Pifer gave the standard USG canned answers to all of the journalist's questions which seemed to frustrate some of the journalists who appeared to be looking for more interesting information. Ambassador Pifer was a very smooth speaker who was clearly very knowledgeable about the USG position as he was able to respond to all of the journalists' questions.

Close-up: Ambassador's speech to Moscow State University School of Journalism

On December 17, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Alexander Vershbow gave a speech titled "The new U.S.-Russian relationship and the role of the independent media," to the Moscow State University School of Journalism. Although his speech was fairly typical of the ambassador's public presentations, it was an interesting example of the strategy behind public diplomacy, and what actually happens at Press Section events. The decision that the ambassador needed to give a speech at the Moscow State University School of Journalism was purely strategic, when you consider the many places and groups he is invited to speak in front of everyday. The speech reflected many aspects of the strategy behind America's public diplomacy including it targeted a specific group, it reflected the USG position, and it attempted to show the common ground between Russia and the U.S. where mutual understanding can occur. The ambassador's speech targeted a very specific portion of the Russian population, including future social and media elites. Moscow State University is the most prestigious school in Russia and the School of Journalism trains the next generation of Russian writers and editors. Making Russia's future journalists sympathetic to the United States could greatly help the USG in the future. The ambassador's speech also was an avenue where the USG could voice its position without directly opposing the actions of the Russian federal government. In the few months preceding this speech, the Kremlin had closed down some independent television stations and newspapers. The USG has been trying to encourage a free press in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union and Russian government actions that hindering independent media were not supported by the USG. Confronting President Putin over free press in the traditional diplomacy realm would have caused tension between the two governments, so the USG chose to voice its opinion

indirectly through the ambassador's speech where he condemned limiting the freedom of the press. The ambassador's speech also stressed the key public diplomacy concept of mutual understanding as he tried to liken government to press, because both served the people. Encouraging foreign populations to relate to the USG will ideally make them more sympathetic to the United States and its people.

Despite the ample strategy behind the ambassador's speech on December 17th, what matters is what really happens in the room and how much the ambassador is actually able to influence the audience. The ambassador's speech was mainly about the role of journalism in the modern world and the ever-changing relationship between Russia and the United States. There were over 200 Russian students in the audience and four major television stations reporting on the speech. The ambassador read most of the speech off of notes so it was not the most dynamic speech that I saw him give. After he talked for over an hour, there was a question and answer period. I was shocked by how loud the students were during the speech as they fervently worked on potential questions to ask the ambassador instead of on what he was saying. It did not appear like many of the students were actually listening as they talked with their friends and neighbors throughout the speech. The students questions for the ambassador ranged from "What is your opinion of President Putin?" to "If roles were reversed, and Russia withdrew from the ABM Treaty what would the U.S. do?" to "Why was my visa denied?" Despite the fact that there was a translator for the Russian students who did not know English, the only time the students were very attentive to the ambassador was when he spoke Russian. Overall, it is difficult to measure how influential the ambassador was on the journalism students although judging by their lack of attentiveness, it would seem he was not as

influential as public diplomacy strategy would have predicted. One of the plaguing problems of the study and improvement of public diplomacy is that while it is clear the ways governments try to influence foreign populations, it is nearly impossible to measure and quantify how influential those ways really are.

Impressions of the Press Section

From my experience working for the Press Section and my time shadowing their activities I developed many impressions of this aspect of America's public diplomacy. One of my first impressions was that they seemed very reactive instead of proactive in their relations with the Russian media. Before arriving at the embassy, I had expected the Press Section to hold weekly press conferences with the Russian media to explain the week's news from the embassy and to answer questions, similar to the regular briefings held by the Department of State and Defense in Washington D.C. I asked Foreign Service Officers in the Press Section about this and they responded that the approach with the media is at the complete discretion of the current Press Attaché. Prior Press Attaches had indeed been more proactive with the Russian press but the current Press Attaché was choosing because of his personality to be more reactive. Being an outsider to public diplomacy, it seems to me that being proactive would be a better position to take so that you would effectively shape what was happening, instead of merely reacting to Russian press reports. This discrepancy between being a proactive or reactive Press Attaché provided the lesson that America's public diplomacy could vary greatly in approach at each embassy because the discretion is given to local officers and is not all mandated by Mainstate. Of all three of the sections of PAS Moscow, the Press Section seemed the least people oriented and access friendly which is ironic considering that its mission is to

communicate with foreign publics. Like the Cultural Section programs, the Press activities are all strategically targeted at specific elements of the foreign population, revealing a main characteristic of American public diplomacy. Instead of targeting leaders in many different professions like the exchange programs do, the press activities target Russian government officials, influential media elites and sometimes the general Russian public. American public diplomacy is very calculated, deliberate and strategic in nature, all of the programs and activities have intentional audiences and clear missions. I was surprised by the thoroughness in which the Press Section monitored the local print and electronic media. I hadn't imagined that they would employ the personnel to read and listen to most of the major papers and stations in an effort of analyzing Russian public opinion. It was interesting working at the embassy during the initial stages of the War on Terrorism because I could watch the Press Section hone in on Russian opposition to U.S. foreign policy actions and the subsequent reactions of Russian Muslim leaders.

INFORMATION RESOURCE CENTER

The Information Resource Center (IRC) of PAS Moscow is the smallest section of the three employing only one American officer and three Foreign Service Nationals yet it has a very important role in the mission of public diplomacy. The Information Resource Center exists to provide accurate, timely information about any aspect of the United States directly to whoever inquires in the host country. In many countries around the world it is difficult to find truthful information and statistics about America so the IRC exists to make that task easier and information assessable. If a Russian journalist has a question about a statistic relating to American society, she can contact the Information Resource Center (IRC) and get the answer quickly. If Russian students or NGO's are

looking for information about a particular aspect of the United States, they can contact the IRC and be given resources. For many years the IRC of Moscow operated a public library with certain hours where the Russian public could go and get the answers to their questions yet in the past few years, PAS Moscow has found it more efficient to manage a electronic information databases where Russians can contact the IRC through the phone and email and get accurate information quickly. While many U.S. embassies around the world still operate IRC's that are open to the public, the Information Resource Center in Moscow in addition to their closed electronic IRC, has created a new idea of operating public access libraries across their host country called American Centers and American Corners. Although the American Centers and Corners are a uniquely PAS Moscow idea, the IRC uses the same International Information Programs materials and sources that all IRC's use around the world. Because most of the activities of the IRC focus on providing information and not coordinating programs like other sections in the PAS, it is logical to examine close-up the American Centers and Corners as an example of the IRC conducting public diplomacy.

Close-up: American Centers and Corners- Homeland Security Speech

American Centers are large libraries that have a circulating collection of books about various aspects of the United States, current magazines and periodicals, public access computers with printers, CD-ROMS and internet access. American Corners are smaller, more compact versions of the Centers which focus on electronic databases and computer access. The first American Center opened in 1993 and the first American Corner in 1998. There are already five American Centers in the largest Russian cities and seventeen American Corners across the country with plans to build many more in the

next few years. American Centers and Corners are started with based funding by PAS Moscow and they are housed in Russian public libraries across the country. The public library has to provide the office space and the staff to support the center or corner. The director at each center is allowed to choose the activities of the center and most centers have weekly English discussion groups, screening of American movies, exhibits on American society, American visitors speakers and celebrations of U.S. holidays. American Centers and Corners provide a place where people can congregate who are interested in learning more about the United States, getting on the internet or meeting alumni of other USG programs.

The American Center in Moscow is the hub of many weekly activities for Russians who are interested in learning about the United States including a Monday night guest lecturer presentation. I attended a speech in October by an American Foreign Service Officer in the Political Section on Homeland Security. His speech was a dynamic example of typical public diplomacy programs because it involved a current American government issue, it represented his personal viewpoint as an American citizen instead of the view of the USG, and it directly explained American politics to the Russian people without the intervention of their government. His speech covered the Homeland Security Act and the new Cabinet position, and reasons why the government would want to reshuffle its organization. References to the War on Terrorism were rampant throughout the presentation, showing how easily current government activities can infiltrate existing PAS programs. The speaker stressed his viewpoints to the audience and explained that not all Americans hold the same opinions as he does. Representing the diversity of American opinions is one of the main goals of improving mutual understanding. This

presentation also is clearly an example of Americans talking to and with Russians directly without the involvement of their governments. There were about forty Russians at the lecture and after the Foreign Service officer finished speaking for an hour there was a lively question and answer session. The audience was full of questions for the speaker but they seemed the most interested in what were the motives of the terrorists, reasons for the U.S. reaction and what countries were possible future U.S. targets. Some members of the audience seemed stuck on the possibility of the U.S. bombing Iraq. This presentation was a very successful public diplomacy program as it encouraged thoughtful dialogue between Americans and Russians, and exposed Russians to the internal political debates that the U.S. was currently struggling with.

Impressions of the Information Resource Center

I was first exposed to the American Centers during my second day on the job when the Cultural Attaché, sent me to visit the American Center in Moscow because he thought it would help me understand what PAS was doing. I did not understand until I visited the Moscow American Center why PAS would fund libraries and how it related to public diplomacy. The idea of creating libraries that were full of information specifically on the U.S. seemed like blatant propaganda to me but upon visiting the Center multiple times, it was apparent how popular they were and the wide-audience that was using them, even if they were propaganda. American public diplomacy is fundamentally about providing information and in countries such as Russia where the media has been controlled for generations, information is a resource that has been chronically underfunded and ignored. Public Access libraries such as the American Centers and Corners are attempts by the USG to fill that information bubble and provide accurate information

about the United States to people who are interested. The IRC appeared easily accessible for Russians with questions and it seemed to be the section with the clearest return for the money it was spending. Of all of the programs that I observed during my internship, the American Centers impressed me the most because Russians who were interested could go learn about whatever they wanted about America and they could meet other Russians with similar interests.

CONCLUSION

After an examination of the definition, history, organization and programs that constitute the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, the original question remains; what is America's public diplomacy? It is the Fulbright scholar from Ghana who is studying in the United States; it is the USG sponsored trip to America that Margaret Thatcher and Kofi Annan took when they were young aspiring leaders; it is the library packed with application materials for U.S. universities and colleges that is constantly brimming full of Russian high school students in Moscow; it is the weekly English discussion groups at U.S. consulates around China; it is jazz night on the Voice of America playing around the world; it is free internet access to the public in Siberia. More than any other aspect of public diplomacy, it is defined by the programs and people that it touches every day, across every culture, around the world. Although the September 11th attacks are what brought public diplomacy back into the national spotlight, I have come to believe that all though not well known- America's real public diplomacy occurs not in the limelight of wartime, but on a daily basis in the normal activities and programs of Public Affairs Sections around the world. I focused in this report on some of the regular programs of Moscow PAS because that is the real American public diplomacy that students of

international politics and the American public do not know about. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to witness America's real public diplomacy as I worked and participated in the activities of the Moscow Public Affairs Section. I could have read every book or article ever written about public diplomacy and still not have understood what it was really about until I talked with a Russian businessman whose trip to the U.S. ten years earlier had changed his life, and until I answered questions from inquisitive Russians about the state of American moral after the terrorists attacks. America's public diplomacy is fundamentally about people, and programs that connect people around the world to the United States with the goal of increasing mutual understanding.

Although public diplomacy as a tool of American foreign policy has taken a great deal of condemnation and reduction in funding in the past ten years, the events of September 11th have made the importance of American public diplomacy clear once again. In the months following the terrorists' attacks on the U.S., there were calls within the government and across the nation for more money to be poured into our public diplomacy efforts in Central Asia and Muslim dominated countries. September 11th and the subsequent War on Terrorism clearly brought public diplomacy back into the public arena for scrutiny and answers, but what did all of the attention tell us about our public diplomacy apparatus? The two hearings that the House International Relations Committee held during the fall of 2001, concluded that the terrorist attacks were a wake up call that America needed to re-examine its public diplomacy apparatus, not only the programs and the structure, but the purpose and mission behind them (U.S. Congress 2001). They suggested that America could no longer neglect this aspect of foreign policy and we need to review and possibly change the current structure to prepare adequately for

the twenty-first century (U.S. Congress 2001). The terrorist attacks opened America's eyes to the contingent of the world's population that is fervently anti-American, and it became apparent that regardless of who is to blame for their views, that hatred is clearly now our problem. How foreign publics view the United States no longer only affects America's business interests abroad and our official traditional diplomacy efforts, but it clearly can threaten the lives of Americans in America.

Since September 11th, America needs to ask the hard questions about our public diplomacy apparatus. Is the message we are trying to send the one that is being received? Are we listening or merely talking at foreign populations? Is our public diplomacy apparatus updated from the Cold War so it can face the unknown challenges of this century? Is America's public diplomacy working? Asking the hard questions, and acting on the answers is essential to making America's public diplomacy apparatus effective in the intricate international political arena of the twenty-first century.

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